

Message Text

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INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 PEKING 736

EXDIS

E.O.11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US, UR, PINT, OREP (PRICE, MELVIN)

SUBJECT: CODEL PRICE MEETING WITH CHANG CHUN-CHIAO

REF: PEKING 723

SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT. IN NEARLY TWO-HOUR CONVERSATION
APRIL 20 WITH CODEL PRICE, VICE PREMIER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO WAS
QUESTIONED RATHER CLOSELY ON THE PRC'S DEFENSE POLICIES AND PLANNING.
HE LARGELY REITERATED THE FAMILIAR POLICY POINTS MADE TO THE GROUP
BY FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA, INCLUDING THE KEY ONE,
WHERE THIS GROUP WAS CONCERNED, THAT CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY IS
ESSENTIALLY SELF-RELIANT. HE WAS GENERALLY EVASIVE ABOUT DETAILS
OF CHINA'S DEFENSE BUDGET AND ITS IMPORTS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY,
BUT SAID THE BUDGET HAD INCREASED IF TUNNEL-BUILDING AND
MILITIA COSTS WERE INCLUDED, WHICH THEY NORMALLY ARE NOT.
HE INDICATED THE TUNNELS WERE AS MUCH FOR FIGHTING SOVIET
GROUND FORCES AS FOR AIR DEFENSE. HE REVEALED THAT NO ONE
HAD BEEN NAMED TO REPLACE TENG HSIAO-PING AS CHIEF OF THE
PLA GENERAL FHAFF, BUT PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS
POSITION AND CLAIMED TENG HAD DONE LITTLE DURING
HIS INCUMBENCY. CHANG HIMSELF, PERHAPS IN PART TO GET OUT
FROM UNDER THE PERSISTENT QUESTIONING ON DEFENSE MATTERS,
RAISED THE TIEN AN MEN SQUARE INCIDENT. BUT HE MINIMIZED
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ITS IMPORTANCE AND THEN WENT ON TO STRESS THE CONTINUITY OF

CHINESE POLICY AS DETERMINED BY CHAIRMAN MAO. AT THE
OUTSET CHANG (UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE THAT THE CODEL
HAD BEEN FAVORED WITH A PERFORMANCE OF THE TAIWAN SONG WHILE
VISITING A PLA INFANTRY DIVISION HEADQUARTERS) POINTED OUT
THAT NEXT DOOR TO THEIR MEETING PLACE IN THE GREAT HALL OF THE
PEOPLE WAS THE ROOM RESERVED FOR TAIWAN PROVINCE. HE DID
NOT RETURN TO THE SUBJECT OF TAIWAN, HOWEVER.

THE CODEL WAS NOT PLEASED WITH CHANG'S PERFORMANCE,
FINDING IT CONSIDERABLY LESS DIPLOMATIC THAN CHIAO'S HAD BEEN
(PARA 16). THE CODEL MEMBERS FOR THEIR PART CHALLENGED A
NUMBER OF THE STAPLE CHINESE THESES ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT.
REP

WOLFF TOLD CHANG IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS (PARA 9) THAT WHILE
WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. MIGHT BEGIN AS A CON-
VENTIONAL WAR, THE US WOULD USE EVERY MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL
TO ASSURE VICTORY.

THE CODEL WAS DISAPPOINTED AT NOT MEETING WITH PREMIER
HUA KUO-FENG, WHO (AS A CHINESE OFFICIAL POINTED OUT TO US) WAS
BUSY WITH THE EGYPTIAN VICE PRESIDENT. BUT WHERE THE CHINESE
PUBLIC AND WORLD AUDIENCE ARE CONCERNED, THE WELL-PUBLICIZED
MEETING, BRINGING TOGETHER FOR THE FIRST TIME ONE OF THE TOP
FIGURES OF THE PRC'S POLITICAL LEFT FOR A "FRIENDLY TALK" WITH
AMERICAN OFFICIALS, MAY HAVE BEEN MEANT TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE
SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE.

TANG WEN-SHENG(NANCY TANG), MFA DEPUTY
DEPARTMENT
DIRECTOR, MOVED IN ON CHANG'S INTERPRETER SEVERAL
TIMES TO MAKE SURE CHANG GOT THE MAIN POINTS OF A CODEL
MEMBER'S REMARKS. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG
WAS, AS SHE USUALLY IS ON SUCH OCCASIONS, A SILENT OBSERVER.
END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.

1. TAIWAN. CODEL EARLIER HAD THAT AFTERNOON BEEN TAKEN ON A
TOUR OF THE GREAT HALL. PICKING UP A REFERENCE TO THIS BY
REP. PRICE IN THE OPENING PLEASANTRIES, CHANG SAID:
OUR NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS IS HELD HERE. EACH
PROVINCE HAS ITS OWN. OVER THERE (POINTING) IS THE
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PROVINCE OF TAIWAN, BEYOND THIS DOOR. WHEN THE NPC
IS IN SESSION, DEPUTIES FROM THE DIFFERENT PROVINCES MEET
IN THEIR OWN HALLS, WHICH ARE DECORATED WITH SPECIALITIES
FROM THEIR OWN PROVINCE. THE BEST WAY TO TRAVEL IN
CHINA IS TO TOUR THE VARIOUS HALLS HERE.

2. ASKED BY REP. PRICE HOW HE
THOUGHT THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD WORK TOGETHER IN THE AREA OF

DEFENSE, AND WHAT THE REQUIREMENTS WERE FOR MUTUAL UNDER-
STANDING ON THE QUESTION OF SECURITY IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD,
CHANG SAID:

ON DEFENSE QUESTIONS OUR POLICY HAS BEEN STATED BY
FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO. IN OUR COUNTRY, THE MILITARY
LINE IS SUBORDINATE TO THE DEFENSE LINE. (WE WORK FOR)
SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND BUILDING UP OUR COUNTRY. WE
ALSO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE OUTSIDE THREAT. AT
PRESENT THE BIGGEST THREAT COMES FROM OUR NEIGHBOR
TO THE NORTH. OUR WAY OF DEALING WITH THIS IS
TO RELY ON OURSELVES. IT IS CLEARLY STATED IN OUR CONSTI-
TUTION THAT CHINA FAVORS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, SUPPORTS REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES
AND WILL TAKE ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IMPERIALIST
AGGRESSION. I HAVE A QUESTION: WHAT IS THE U.S.
DOING IN THE PACIFIC, SINCE IT IS AGAINST THE U.S. THAT
THE USSR IS DIRECTING ITS SPEARHEAD IN THE
PACIFIC?

3. REP. PRICE'S RESPONSE NOTED THE PRIMACY OF NON-MILITARY CONCERNS
IN
THE US AND THE CONSEQUENT DIFFICLTIES OF KEEPING ADEQUATE US FORCES
IN
THE PACIFIC AND ELSEWHERE. IT ENDED WITH TWO QUESTIONS (THE
FIRST OF WHICH CHANG DID NOT GET AROUND TO ANSWERING): WHAT WAS
PRC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD US EFFORTS IN DIEGO GARCIA, AND "WHAT
SHOULD WE BE DOING THAT WE ARE NOT DOING?"

4. CHANG SAID HE THOUGHT
FOCUS OF US-USSR CONTENTION
WAS IN EUROPE AND THAT THE US SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION
TO EUROPE. THE SOVIETS HAD ACHIEVED THE LEAST IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC, BUT HAD MADE SOME HEADWAY IN AFRICA AND EUROPE. SOME
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PEOPLE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO ENCIRCLE CHINA, BUT THE
CHINESE DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS ENCIRCLEMENT. WHAT INFORMATION
DID THE AMERICANS HAVE?

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5. REPRESENTATIVE PRICE ASKED IF CHINESE HAD NO CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET'S PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THEIR BUILDING OF A POWERFUL NAVY. CHANG SAID THAT THIS FIRST OF ALL CONCERNED THE US AS THE SOVIET NAVAL EXPANSION SHOWED THAT THE DANGER OF WAR WAS GROWING.

6. REP WOLFF OBSERVED THAT ALTHOUGH THE VICE PREMIER HAD SAID THE SOVIETS DIDN'T POSE A THREAT OF ENCIRCLEMENT, THERE WERE MANY SOVIET DIVISIONS ON CHINA'S BORDERS. IF THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE WEST, FACING EUROPE, WERE LESSENED, IT WOULD MEAN MORE AVAILABLE TO FACE CHINA, SO THAT THERE WAS A OBLANIONSHIP. CHANG SAID HE AGREED, OF COURSE THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP, BUT ASKED IF IT WASN'T SO THAT THE MAIN BODY OF SOVIET TROOPS WAS IN EUROPE. REP. PRICE ASKED IF CHANG WAS SAYING THERE WAS NO CONCERN IN CHINA OR IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD OVER A THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

7. CHANG INSISTED THAT FROM A GLOBAL POINT OF VIEW, THE FOCUS OF THE SOVIET THREAT REMAINED IN EUROPE. REP. STRATTON COMMENTED THAT THE CODEL'S REASON FOR BEING HERE WAS ITS RECOGNITION OF A SOVIET THREAT TO PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, AND ITS FEELING THAT CHINA SHARED THIS VIEW. THERE WAS NO SENSE IN ARGUING OVER WHETHER
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THE THREAT WAS IN EUROPE OR THE PACIFIC; THOSE WHO RECOGNIZED THE THREAT SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO DETER IT FROM ERUPTING HERE OR THERE. HE INVITED CHANG'S SUGGESTIONS ON DEALING WITH THE THREAT. CHANG:

WE ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE A THREAT TO THE WORLD AND NOT JUST TO A SPECIFIC REGION. WHERE

YOU DON'T AGREE WITH US IS ON THE POINT THAT THE FOCUS IS IN EUROPE. ...SINCE MOST OF YOU ARE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE YOU MUST CONSIDER THAT WAR BREAKS OUT WHERE THE FOCUS IS. ANY MILITARY MAN UNDERSTANDS THIS. THERE'S NO NEED FOR ARGUMENT ON THIS POINT. EACH SIDE (THE US AND PRC) SHOULD ACT IN ITS OWN WAY. WE CANNOT MAKE SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE US SHOULD BUILD ITS FORCES, AND VICE VERSA. WE HAVE DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. ONE POINT IN COMMON IS THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

8. REP. STRATTON SAID THE CODEL HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM EARLIER CONGRESSIONAL GROUPS THAT THE PRC FELT THE US SHOULD REMAIN IN THE PACIFIC AND NOT WITHDRAW ITS FORCES BECAUSE OF DETENTE. IF THE US REMAINED STRONG IN THE PACIFIC THIS WOULD REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR. TO SAY THAT THE PRC DIDN'T CARE WHAT THE US DID SUGGESTED THE PRC'S POSITION HAD CHANGED; THAT IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE IF THE US WITHDREW FROM KOREA AND GUAM BACK TO PEARL HARBOR. WAS THIS REALLY THE PRC POSITION? TANG WEN-SHENG INTERJECTED THAT THE QUESTION WAS ESPECIALLY ON WHETHER PRC POLICY HAD CHANGED. CHANG: WE HAVE STATED OUR POSITION OFTEN ON THIS QUESTION AND OUR VIEWS HAVE NOT CHANGED. AS FOR KOREA, WE HAVE ALSO STATED OUR POSITION. SINCE THE KOREAN PEOPLE DON'T APPROVE OF YOUR PRESENCE, HOW CAN WE SAY WE APPROVE. AS I'VE SAID, IN THE PACIFIC THE SPEARHEAD OF THE SOVIETS IS DIRECTED AT THE U.S. AND THE US OUGHT TO FIND A WAY TO DEAL WITH IT. YOUR PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC IS A FACT AND THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO SQUEEZE YOU OUT. WE ALSO FAVOR FRIENDLY US-JAPAN RELATIONS. WE DON'T SAY THIS QUESTION IS OF NO CONCERN TO US. THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEAN. STRATTON, FOLLOWING UP, PRESSED FOR BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY POLICIES, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH POSITIONS COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE PACIFIC THAT WOULD DETER THE SOVIETS. HE CONFIDENTIAL

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REMARKED THAT IF THE US WITHDREW FROM KOREA AND JAPAN THIS WOULD BE AN INVITATION FOR THE SOVIETS TO MOVE IN. CHANG: I THINK WE SHOULDN'T ARGUE THE POINT. IN KOREA THE PEOPLE WILL SETTLE THE QUESTION. WE DON'T BELIEVE IN A VACUUM THERE. (NOTE: CHANG APPARENTLY MEANT CHINESE DO NOT BELIEVE US WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA WOULD CREATE A VACUUM THERE.) REP. DICKINSON, NOTED PRESSURES ON CONGRESS AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FOR PAST SEVERAL YEARS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM EUROPE AND PACIFIC AND ESPECIALLY KOREA. HE ASKED WHAT CHINESE REACTION WOULD BE IF US FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA. TANG "CLARIFIED" THE QUESTION. CHANG: AT PRESENT YOU ARE NOT PREPARING TO WITHDRAW TROOPS.

IF YOU WITHDRAW THEM, THE KOREAN PEOPLE WILL BE PLEASED. WE CANNOT ADVISE YOU ON EVERY QUESTION OF WHERE YOU SHOULD AND SHOULDN'T WITHDRAW, BUT ON THE WHOLE THE US HAS SCATTERED ITS STRENGTH THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE QUESTION IS, WHERE IS THE FOCUS. IN A WAR, IF YOU DON'T KNOW WHERE THE FOCUS IS, HOW CAN YOU FIGHT? SHOULD THE US CLOSE TEN FINGERS TO FORM A FIST OR SHOULD IT TRY TO HOLD DOWN TEN FLEAS WITH TEN FINGERS?

REP. WILSON COMMENTED THAT THE FOCUS OF THE US WAS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS. CITING THE EXTRA FUNDS VOTED BY CONGRESS FOR SHIPS INCLUDING THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE, HE NOTED THAT IF THE SOVIETS GAINED NAVAL SUPREMACY THEY COULD INTERDICT THE MOVEMENT OF OIL TO JAPAN THROUGH MALACCA STRAITS. CHANG ASKED IF THE US OR THE USSR WERE STRONGER IN NAVAL FORCES. REP. PRICE SAID THE US WAS STRONGER; REP. WILSON ADDED "AT PRESENT." REP. PRICE SAID WE WERE TAKING STEPS, E.G. THE NAVAL BUDGET INCREASES, TO SEE THAT THIS CONTINUED TO BE THE CASE. CHANG ASKED WHICH SIDE WOULD BE STRONGER. THE USSR OR THE US AND ITS ALLIES, IF THERE WERE A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE. REP. PRICE SAID IT WAS A QUESTION OF POTENTIAL FORCES, NOT THOSE NOW IN BEING. HISTORY HAD SHOWN THE US COULD BUILD UP ITS FORCES QUICKLY WHEN FIGHTING STARTED. WE HAD ENTERED BOTH WORLD WARS WITH NO FORCES TO SPEAK OF. SINCE WORLD WAR II WE HAD MAINTAINED HIGHER FORCES THAN USUAL BECAUSE OF THYSSOVIET THREAT. THE US COULD EXPAND ITS FORCES QUICKLY BUT IN THE MEANTIME MUST KEEP UP ITS R & D EFFORTS. WHEN CHANG COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD "CONSIDERABLY CONFIDENTIAL

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LARGE" FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE, PRICE AGREED, ADDING THAT IS WHERE ONE WOULD EXPECT TO FIND THEM. US FORCES WERE IN EUROPE AS PART OF THE NATO ARRANGEMENTS, BUT WE WERE NOT MAINTAINING LARGE FORCES THERE OR ANYWHERE ELSE EITHER.

9. REP. WOLFF THEN SAID WE COULD ASSUME THAT IF WAR AROSE IT WOULD NOT BE SELECTIVE; THERE WAS NO CONTROLLING WHERE THE DOGS OF WAR WOULD BITE ONCE THEY WERE UNLEASHED. WORLD WAR II HAD STARTED AS A CONVENTIONAL WAR BUT ENDED WITH USE OF

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ONE COULD ASSUME IHAT THERE WOULD BE NO
US-SOVIET WAR THAT WOULD NOT ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WAR.
RECALLING THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO HAD SAID WAR WAS
INEVITABLE, REP. WOLFF SAID THAT INSTEAD OF ENGAGING IN
POLEMICS OVER WHERE THE WAR WOULD START, WE SHOULD TRY TO FIND
MEANS OF POSTPONING IT, BECAUSE IF WAR CAME IT WOULD BE A
DISASTER FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. NEITHER CHINA NOR THE US
COULD STAY OUT. THOUGH HE WAS OPPOSED TO NUCLEAR WAR AND HAD
BEEN A DOVE ON VIETNAM, WOLFF SAID, THE US WOULD NOT BE
DEFEATED BY THE USSR AND WOULD RESORT TO ANY MEANS TO
ACHIEVE VICTORY. TANG EXPLAINED THE MEANING OF "DOVE." CHANG:
WHEN WAR BREAKS OUT, IT WILL DEVELOP ACCORDING TO ITS
OWN LAW. THERE IS ALSO A LAW OF DEVELOPMENT AS TO WHERE
THE DOGS WILL BITE. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE DOGS TO BITE
IN EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE. I THINK IT WILL BITE IN
EUROPE. THE OVERALL SITUATION IS TENSE, IN EUROPE
AND ELSEWHERE.
CHANG ARGUED THAT APOLICY OF ACCOMMODATING, APPEASING THE SOVIETS
WOULD ONLY ACCELERATE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. HE WENT ON:
FROM OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THEM, WE SEE THAT THE SOVIETS
BULLY THE SOFT AND FEAR THE TOUGH. WE HAVE SAID THAT
CHINA IS A PIECE OF MEAT THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO BITE.
BUT THE BONES IN THE MEAT ARE TOO TOUGH.
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THEY

WILL BREAK OFF THE SOVIETS' TEETH. THIS IS OUR VIEW.

10. REP. WHITEHURST ASKED WHAT AREAS CHINA CONCENTRATED ON
TO MAKE THE SOVIETS UNWILLING TO ATTACK. WOULD CHINA INCREASE

ITS MILITARY BUDGET AS THE US WAS DOING? MENTIONING THE CODEL'S VISIT TO AN INFANTRY DIVISION (SEPTTEL), HE ASKED WHAT OTHER AREAS THE PRC WAS CONCENTRATING ON-- DID THEY ENVISAGE A GUERILLA WAR TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET THREAT, OR MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS? CHANG: OUR POLICY IS VERY SIMPLE: IT IS PEOPLE'S WAR. THIS INCLUDES CONVENTIONAL WAR AND GUERILLA WARFARE. YET YOU SAW OUR DIVISION; OBVIOUSLY IT WILL FIGHT A REGULAR WAR. BUT OUR LARGEST FORCE IS OUR MILITIA. TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, THOSE WITH THE GREATEST EXPERIENCE OF WAR ARE AT LOCAL LEVELS. IF WE CALL FOR MOBILIZATION, WE CAN MOBILIZE TENS OF MILLIONS OF TROOPS IN A SHORT TIME. AND HAVE MANY CADRES WITH EXPERIENCE IN WAR. HOW WE FIGHT WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE WAR ARISES. IT'S NO SECRET WE CONCENTRATE OUR FORCES AGAINST THE NORTH. REP. WHITEHURST AGAIN ASKED IF THE PRC MILITARY BUDGET, LIKE THE US WAS INCREASING. CHANG: OUR BUDGET LIKE YOURS IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE. IT IS HARD TO TELL WHAT IS MILITARY AND WHAT ISN'T THE CONCEPTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES DIFFER. WE ARE BUILDING MANY AIRRAID SHELTERS WHICH ARE NOT IN THE BUDGET. OUR MILITIA EXERCISE DAILY; THIS IS NOT IN THE BUDGET. OUR MILITARY INDUSTRY ALSO MANUFACTURES CIVILIAN PRODUCTS, AND CIVILIAN INDUSTRIES CAN MAKE GUNS. ORDINARY FACTORIES ARE ABLE TO MAKE RIFLES AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY. MANY MILITIA CAN REPAIR THEIR OWN WEAPONS AND COMMUNES CAN MAKE MINES AND GUNPOWDER. ALL THIS IS NOT IN THE BUDGET. OUR BUDGET FLUCTUATES LITTLE, AND EVEN IF IT INCREASES THE AMOUNT WON'T BE MUCH. BUT IF YOU INCLUDE AIRRAID SHELTERS AND MILITIA IT IS A BIG INCREASE. IN THE US THERE IS DEBATE IN CONGRESS OVER INCREASING THE BUDGET. THAT DOESN'T HAPPEN IN CHINA. YOU HAVE TO VOTE. WE DON'T.

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11. REP. ICHORD OBSERVED THAT IT WAS HARD FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL PROCESS. TENG HSIAO-PING BEING NO LONGER PLA CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, HAD THE POSITION BEEN FILLED, AND BY WHOM? CHANG: OUR MILITARY AS FOUNDED BY CHAIRMAN MAO IS ALWAYS UNDER PARTY LEADERSHIP. OUR CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S MILITARY COMMISSION IS IN CHARGE OF THE ARMED FORCES; ITS CHAIRMAN IS CHAIRMAN MAO. I CAN SAY THAT TENG IS NO LONGER CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO NEW APPOINTMENT. IT DOESN'T MATTER WHETHER WE HAVE A CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF. IN OUR COUNTRY WE DIDN'T

HAVE ONE FOR SEVERAL
YEARS. I CAN SAY THAT WHEN TENG WAS CHIEF OF
GENERAL STAFF HE DID LITTLE IN THAT CAPACITY, BUT
PLEASE DON'T LET THIS GET OUT.

12. RESPONDING TO AN APPROVING
COMMENT BY REP. WILSON ON THE PRC'S TUNNEL PROGRAM, AND
REP. WILSON'S SUGGESTION THAT CHINA EXPECTED SOME NUCLEAR
WARFARE WITH THE RUSSIANS, CHANG SAID:
WHEN WE DIG TUNNELS, WE AIM NOT ONLY AT PREVENTING
AIR RAIDS. WE ASSUME EVERY CITY MUST FIGHT THE WAR.
WHEN THE SOVIETS COME, EVERY CITY MUST FIGHT. THE
TUNNELS
ARE PART OF OUR PREPAREDNESS FOR FIGHTING.
DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION MANY VILLAGES HAD
UNDERGROUND TUNNELS. THE JAPANESE HAD THEIR
FORH ESSES #
ABOVE, BUT THEY COULDN'T ESTABLISH
CONTROL. AS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OF COURSE WE CARRY
ON RESEARCH, MAINLY BECAUSE IF WE DON'T SOME PEOPLE
WILL TRY TO OULVQ#AND INTIMIDATE US. NOW WE CAN SAY
YOU HAVE THEM(NUCLEAR WEAPONS) AND WE HAVE THEM.
BUT WE HAVE ONLY A FEW, AND EVEN IN THE FUTURE WE
WON'T HAVE AS MANY AS YOU. YOU AND THE SOVIETS
HAVE A GREAT MANY, MORE THAN CHINA HAS. BUT IF
THERE ARE TOO MANY, THERE IS NOT MUCH USE FOR THEM.

13. CHANG THEN IMMEDIATELY
CHANGED THE SUBJECT, ASKING IF THE CODEL HAD SEEN "GREAT
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TURMOIL" SINCE COMING TO PEKING. REPS PRICE AND WILSON
COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD NOT. REP. WILSON WENT ON TO MENTION
THE CODEL'S PLEASURE AT BEING THE FIRST TO SEE AN INFANTRY UNIT.
THE CODEL WOULD BE GOING TO DARIEN TO SEE A NAVAL UNIT.
(SOMEONE ON THE CHINESE SIDE INTERJECTED: "TOTEE THE HARBOR.")
REP. WILSON CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT NOTHING
WOULD AFFECT THIS DOOR OPENED TO FRIENDSHIP AND EXHCHANGES. CHANG:
I ASKED BECAUSE AT THE TIME OF YOUR DEPARTURE FROM
THE US THERE WERE A LOT OF NEWS REPORTS ABOUT DISORDERS
IN TIEN AN MEN SQUARE AND GREAT TURMOIL IN CHINA. I
WANTED TO KNOW YOUR IMPRESSIONS. AS FOR THE CHANGES

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EXDIS

IN OUR GOVERNMENT, THERE IS SPECULATION THAT THESE WILL BRING PROBLEMS AND CHANGES IN POLICY. IMPACT AND CHANGE IN PREMIER CAME ABOUT BECAUSE PREMIER CHOU DIED, AND NOT BECAUSE OF ANY GREAT INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP AND STAFF MEMBERS ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH POLICY. IN OUR COUNTRY THE LINE AND POLICY ARE FORMULATED BY CHAIRMAN MAO. CHAIRMAN MAO FORMULATED OUR LINE AND POLICY ON MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD SITUATION. I WILL GIVE YOU EXAMPLES TO SHOW THAT CHANGES IN PERSONNEL WON'T MEAN CHANGES IN POLICY. TAKE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. WHEN WE HAD FRIENDLY RELATIONS, CHOU EN-LAI WAS PREMIER. WHEN CHINA AND THE USSR HAD A FALLING OUT, CHOU EN-LAI REMAINED PREMIER. THE SAME PERSON WAS PREMIER BUT THE POLICY CHANGED. IT CHANGED BECAUSE THE SITUATION CHANGED, BOTH THE ONE IN CHINA. AND IN THE SOVIET UNION, BREZHNEV REPLACED KHRUSHCHEV, BUT THE LINE AND POLICY WERE NOT CHANGED. SO, IN THIS QUESTION LOOK AT THE LINE AND POLICY OF A COUNTRY, NOT AT CHANGES IN PERSONNEL, I READ THAT BREZHNEV IS IN POOR HEALTH AND WILL BE REPLACED AND THEN THERE WILL BE A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY. I THINK THEIR POLICY WON'T CHANGE. US-PRC RELATIONS

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CHANGED WHILE CHOU WAS THE PREMIER, BECAUSE THE SITUATION CHANGED. I'VE EXPLAINED THIS POINT.

14. REP. RANDALL, AFTER TOUCHING ON VARIOUS POINTS COVERED EARLIER IN THE CONVERSATION, ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT THE PRC WAS BUYING SOME ARMAMENT MATERIALS FROM ABROAD. CHANG: OUR POLICY, AS YOU UNDERSTAND WELL, IS SELF-RELIANCE AND INDEPENDENCE. AS FOR MILITARY MATERIALS, WE BUY SOME AND WE SELL SOME. WE SELL SOME MILITARY MATERIALS AND WE BUY SOME. IT IS HARD TO DEFINE WHICH ARE MILITARY MATERIALS AND WHICH ARE NOT. SOME SAY THIS OR THAT IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND WE MAY NOT CONSIDER IT SO. OTHERS THINK SOME THINGS ARE NOT OF A STRATEGIC FUTURE AND WE THINK THEY ARE. GRAIN IS AN IMPORTANT STRATEGIC MATERIAL. IF SOLDIERS CAN'T EAT, THEY CAN'T FIGHT. IT IS TRUE THAT WE BUY SOME MILITARY MATERIALS BUT WE MAINLY RELY ON OURSELVES. FROM OUR EXPERIENCE OF TWO DECADES, WE RELY ON OUR OWN EFFORTS TO BUILD OUR MILITARY INDUSTRY, NUCLEAR INCLUDED. IF THERE IS A BLOCKADE AND PEOPLE REFUSE TO SELL US WEAPONS, WE ARE PLEASED BECAUSE WE'LL RELY ON OURSELVES AND WHEN WE RELY ON OURSELVES WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THESE TASKS. "NOTHING IS HARD IF YOU DARE TO SCALE THE HEIGHTS," AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE ARE DOING THIS.

15. REP. PRICE EXPRESSED THANKS ON BEHALF OF ALL. CHANG SAID HE TOO HAD APPRECIATED THE CANDID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, WHICH WOULD PROMOTE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. BUT BECAUSE THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN SO FRANK, HE REQUESTED THAT IT NOT BE PUBLISHED. REP. PRICE ASSURED HIM THE DISCUSSION WOULD NOT BE PUT ON THE RECORD. CHANG ADDED: IF YOU DON'T PUBLISH AND IF YOU COME AGAIN WE CAN HAVE A FREE EXCHANGE. IF YOU PUBLISH, WE WILL REFRAIN FROM TALKING (FRANKLY) NEXT TIME.

16. ATMOSPHERICS. NCNA'S REPORT OF THE MEETING DESCRIBED IT AS A "FRIENDLY TALK" AND THE SHORT FILM CLIP SHOWN IN PEKING TELEVISION SHOWED A SMILING CHANG ENERGETICALLY SHAKING HANDS WITH EACH MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN PARTY AND THEN EXCHANGING INITIAL PLEASANTRIES WITH REP. PRICE. BUT CHANG, CONFIDENTIAL

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THOUGH TAKING THE SAME SUBSTANTIVE LINE WITH THE CODEL AS CHIAO HAD EARLIER, CAME ACROSS TO THE CODEL AS MUCH LESS DIPLOMATIC, REPS. PRICE AND WOLFF BOTH COMMENTED TO US THAT THEY FELT AT TIMES CHANG WAS NEEDLING THE CODEL. ASIDE FROM THE CONTENTS OF HIS REMARKS, WHICH SEEMED AT TIMES UNNECESSARILY DIDACTIC OR GRATUITOUSLY NEGATIVE, A COUPLE OF CHANG'S PERSONAL MANNERISMS DID NOT GO OVER WELL. HE GIGGLED FREQUENTLY, AND

GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF LOOKING AT, AND PLAYING TO, THE OTHER
CHINESE PRESENT MORE THAN TO HIS INTERLOCUTORS.
THOMAS

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